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Abstract. This article illustrates some of the psychological advantages possessed by terrorists who 
engage in negotiations with nonterrorists. 
 
Terrorism has been a viable technique of achieving political power throughout history. For some 
individuals, groups, and organizations terrorism has been the only viable technique. Not only has 
terrorism directly effected political salience, political credibility, and ultimate political goals, but it can 
provide a significant advantage when its purveyors engage in formal negotiations with adversaries and 
other competitors who eschew terrorism. 
 
Terrorists usually promise not to engage in terrorism to initiate the negotiations and for the duration of 
the negotiations--as long as these negotiations seem to be occurring in good faith on all sides. Terrorists 
rarely promise to eschew terrorism forever. (That's why terrorists are terrorists.) Because "good faith" is 
operationally defined by the visceral reactions, ideological necessities, and manipulative styles of 
terrorists, the other sides to the negotiation are at the terrorists' mercy. Terrorism is actually occurring 
throughout the negotiation, because the threat of terrorism--itself an exemplar of terrorism--has been 
explicitly made by the terrorists as they enter the negotiation: no good faith, no promise not to engage 
in further terrorist acts. Thus, terrorists have a built-in negotiation advantage. 
 
Another way of looking at this is that the welcoming of terrorists into negotiations based on a promise 
of a temporary cessation of hostilities implicitly legitimizes additional terrorist acts if a breakdown in 
negotiation occurs. To avoid this, nonterrorists face significant pressure to make concessions. In fact, 
through the use of effective information warfare (IW) programs that comprise (1) a periodic breaking off 
of talks allegedly because of a lack of bad faith in some negotiation partner and (2) a succeeding 
terrorist act, terrorists may succeed in badly injuring the foundations of political power of that 
negotiation partner. The dynamics for IW success comprise the manipulation of causal attributions, 
fundamental attribution errors, consensus effects, ingroup and outgroup phenomena, and innuendo 
inductions. 
 
Negotiation with terrorists is truly playing by their rules on their turf. All the more reason for the 
principle that one does not negotiate with terrorists--a principle that has largely been founded on the 
fear of positively reinforcing terrorist acts and that has been broken virtually everywhere and every 
time. 
 
Terrorists have additional advantages when negotiation ends in a formal agreement by all sides. Again 
by visceral, ideological, and manipulative criteria, terrorists will dictate when the agreement has been 
violated--again abrogating any promise not to engage in terrorism. This is to be expected because 
terrorism is what brought the terrorists into the negotiations and successfully brought them to a close. 
In essence, terrorists continue to be positively reinforced for terrorism. 
 
Before, during, and after negotiations, terrorists can continue to effect terrorism through "cut-outs"--so-
called renegade and "uncontrollable" groups that have de facto psychological and/or organizational 
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linkages. Thus, terrorists have the best of all worlds concerning negotiations. They can promise to 
absolve themselves from terrorism, but terrorism can still continue through parties that are not part of 
the negotiations. The very promise not to engage in terrorism carries the implied threat that the 
promise may be taken back depending on circumstances--itself an exemplar of terrorism. And because 
terrorism has largely been responsible for the need on the part of nonterrorists for negotiations, a so-
called catch-22 is operative. For consider that terrorists within the negotiations do engage in additional 
terrorist acts. If they are removed from the negotiations, the negotiations become moot, for the whole 
point was to coopt the terrorists into not committing terrorism. If they are not removed, the same 
consequence occurs. 
 
Negotiations with terrorists are wrong. And as with most things that are wrong, they are done again and 
again and again. (See Heskin, K. (1994). Terrorism in Ireland: The past and the future. Irish Journal of 
Psychology, 15, 469-479; Oots, K.L. (1990). Bargaining with terrorists: Organizational considerations. 
Terrorism, 13, 145-158; O'Sullivan, J. (February 20, 1998). The I.R.A. holds all the cards. The New York 
Times, (http://www.nytimes.com). (Keywords: Information Warfare, Negotiation, Perception 
Management, Terrorism.) 
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